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OPTIMJACK: Malware Served to CNN and Zoom via Optimizely — Act Now

On November 16, 2026, attackers exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely’s account signup flow and injected malicious JavaScript into the Project JavaScript fields of 178 customer sites — including CNN, BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, and HSBC. The code ran straight from Optimizely’s own CDN, authenticated with a valid TLS certificate, through a domain every affected site already trusted. Content Security Policy didn’t block it. WAFs didn’t see it. Only 24 of 256 affected sites stopped the payload. Here is what happened and what you need to do.

The Flaw That Made 190,000 Sites Vulnerable

Optimizely runs on roughly 190,000 websites. Its customers embed a JavaScript snippet from cdn.optimizely.com that handles A/B tests and experimentation. The attacker found a vulnerability in Optimizely’s account signup process that granted unauthorized write access to the Project JavaScript field — the exact field that gets served to every visitor of every affected site.

This is the detail that matters: the attackers did not compromise the CDN. They simply wrote to the content the CDN was already serving. From the network’s point of view, the payload was legitimate. It arrived from a trusted domain with a valid certificate. Any firewall rule, CSP directive, or allowlist that permitted cdn.optimizely.com became the attack’s distribution mechanism.

Standard defenses failed precisely because they were calibrated to the wrong threat model. CSP couldn’t block a trusted domain. WAFs watch server-side traffic, not vendor-served client-side code. Subresource Integrity can’t apply to experiment snippets that change with every A/B test. Of 256 affected sites, 232 were exposed for the full 19-hour window.

Three Payloads in One Attack

The 30.4 KB malicious script contained three independent modules, deployed and expanded throughout the day:

Crypto Address Swapper

The first module ran from the start. It monitored wallet addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Solana, Litecoin, and four other chains across page text, the clipboard API, form inputs, and outgoing network requests. It validated replacements using chain-specific checksums before swapping — meaning it only replaced addresses it was confident were real. It also hooked Function.prototype.call and apply to intercept string-based address comparisons.

Card Skimmer

Added roughly eight hours into the attack, this module wrapped native fetch and XMLHttpRequest, monitored form submissions, and validated card numbers with the Luhn algorithm. Cards were exfiltrated via navigator.sendBeacon to /card.php on the attacker’s server and cached in sessionStorage under cc_ prefixed keys to avoid duplicate sends.

iOS Exploit Delivery

Hidden iframes loaded iOS exploit kits by version: the Coruna kit for iOS 13 through 17, and DarkSword for iOS 18. Pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reloaded every 60 seconds to retry delivery. Screenshots of visible page content and accessible cookies were also POSTed to the attacker’s infrastructure whenever a wallet address swap event fired.

Immediate Actions If You Were Affected

If your site used Optimizely between 04:21 and 23:11 UTC on November 16, treat the exposure as confirmed and act now:

  • Block IOC domains: 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, and the .icu iOS stage hosts (eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu)
  • Search logs from 04:00 UTC November 16 onward for requests to those domains
  • Audit Optimizely Project JavaScript for base64 strings, eval() calls, or unfamiliar script tags
  • Rotate all Optimizely API tokens and audit the account user list for unauthorized additions
  • Treat exposed card data as compromised — notify card networks and affected users
  • Flag iOS devices (iOS 18.6 or earlier) that visited affected pages for forensic review

The Problem Is Structural, Not Just Optimizely’s

OPTIMJACK is the most recent case in a pattern that includes the Polyfill.io attack in 2024 and the long tail of Magecart campaigns. The specifics change — the platform, the flaw, the payload — but the underlying condition is constant: developers have built production deployment pipelines into their websites and outsourced the security model to vendors they don’t control.

Every A/B testing tool, analytics platform, session recorder, and chat widget on your site executes with the same JavaScript privileges as your own code. That’s not a bug in your implementation. It’s the design. And it means your vendor’s breach is your breach, your users’ cards are at risk, and your CSP won’t save you if the attack comes from a domain you’ve already trusted.

The mitigation isn’t to stop using third-party tools. It is to stop putting them on pages where it matters. Payment flows, login pages, and account management pages should run with minimal third-party JavaScript. If you need payment collection on a page loaded with analytics, use a cross-origin iframe — the Stripe Elements model — so external scripts cannot reach the card input fields. Monitor what your third-party scripts do, not just which domains they come from.

Optimizely patched the flaw and cleaned all affected projects by November 17. The full technical breakdown of the attack, including all IOCs and payload analysis, is available from StepSecurity’s OPTIMJACK report. The vulnerability is gone. The lesson isn’t.

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